Battle of the Philippine Sea 80 years ago (19–20 June 1944) wrecked carrier aviation of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Much was told about qualitative and quantitative superiority of the US Navy in this battle. Indeed, those were a factor in battle.
Less is told about battle tactics of the opposing commanders.
Spruance’s tactics of “wait and see” was unimaginative. But he could afford it, after all IJN simply had to come to Saipan to save IJA garrison, where USN was waiting in force.
Ozawa’s tactics of outranging the enemy and aiming not for sinking the enemy carriers, but for eliminating their flying decks, was very bold and novel. But could he afford it?
To find the enemy at great distance Ozawa needed good reconnaissance crews. Which he didn’t have. As a result a lot of his force was simply wasted due to errors of recce crews.
To eliminate many US carriers’ flying deck at once, IJN strike groups were ordered to spread into many targets – failing to hit a single US carrier. BTW, much-praised US fighters failed to intercept a single attack against US CVs.
After the defeat Ozawa bemoaned, that his force was of poor quality and was unable to fulfill his bold plans. That’s true. But isn’t it commander’s duty to make plans according to the actual quality of his force and not some fantasies?
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