30/10/2022

Whataboutism and Japanese military research


Whataboutism in historical research is rightly frowned upon because it’s usually replace discussion of some “inconvenient” question with counter-accusations, tended to discuss anything, but not the original question.

In Japanese military research the most popular place for “what about…” to appear is the discussion of war crimes, committed by the Japanese military. As if war crimes, committed by the Allies, somehow exonerate Japanese war crimes.

However, there are questions in Japanese military research, that simply couldn’t be discussed objectively without “what about…”. Those are qualitative assessments. You can find multiple stories of “Japanese did wrong here”, “Japanese design was bad”, “what were Japanese thinking doing like this”, etc.

Some of those accusations look very serious… until you’ll start to compare Japanese actions, designs, doctrines with those of the USA or other nations. And SUDDENLY you’ll find out that Japanese were just following the popular trends, did the obvious things, even copied US theories or practices. Japanese doesn’t look incompetent or stupid anymore.

Of course, this doesn’t mean Japanese did no incompetent or stupid things or never erred. But comparing Japanese ways of doing things with foreign ways will help you greatly reduce number of false accusations against them. After you’ll manage to ask “what about…” question you’ll see the worldwide exchange of thoughts, doctrines, designs, which Japan was a part of. And not just a “mysterious” (read: “weird”) Japanese mind, suddenly doing weird things.


23/10/2022

Mysteries about IJN carrier strength expansion plan of 1942

 Japanese defeat at Midway on 4-6 June 1942 brought very painful understanding of the importance of the Kido Butai - Carrier Task Force. So Japanese Navy very quickly created a plan to rebuild it, adopting new carrier strength expansion plan on 30 June 1942.

According to the plan, main strength of the new Kido Butai were to compose improved versions of already existing designs: 5 large carriers of the “Taiho” class (with armored flying deck) and 13 medium carriers of the “Unryu” class. To together with original “Taiho” and “Unryu”, that were already building, it provided for 20 carriers = 3 heavy and 7 medium carrier divisions.


Aircraft carrier “Taiho” 

Aircraft carrier “Unryu” 


For details see attached table 7.5 from the book “Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War” by Lacroix and Wells (with some of my clarifications added):



The problem was – building large warship is neither fast nor easy. As a result main strength of the plan to be completed only in 1947(!). So IJN had to improvise, doing quick conversion of other ships in order at least to regain pre-war carrier force strength before new carriers will enter service. 6 ships were chosen for conversion plus 3 more were added later. Other battleships and heavy cruisers were considered, but eventually ideas of their conversion were abandoned due to the need of those ships as they were.

As you can see, according to the above table IJN can’t even achieve December 1941 level of aircraft strength aboard fleet carriers (that is, excluding 4 slow CVs: “Shinyo” and “Taiyo” class) before mid-1944. And IJN expected the number of US fleet aircraft carriers (CVs, CVLs) will be 12 by the end of 1943 (compare with 7 CVs in December 1941).

So the question of “quick and dirty” increase of carrier strength till 1945 at least was of paramount importance for the IJN. There is little use of new carriers if the fleet is already defeated. As it happened in real life in 1944. Of course, lack of carrier capacity is definitely not the only reason for Japanese defeats, yet it’s one of the obscure ones, usually limited to the usual explanations of Japan’s industry problems. But industry did its best: “Taiho” and first 3 “Unryus” were completed before planned dates. Yet it was still too late, as only “Taiho “was able to take part in Philippine Sea Battle against US carrier task force in June 1944.

That’s why the first two years of IJN carrier strength expansion plan of June 1942 worth more careful study.  Could IJN do better there, than in the original plan?

All 1942 FY ships of the plan are pre-Midway plans and little extra could be done here (to be precise “Chuyo” orders to start conversion were issued after Midway battle (on 21 June 1942), but planning for conversion was obviously done before the battle).

Among 1943 FY ships initially there were only two warships: “Chitose” and “Chiyoda”. They were both built as seaplane carriers (CVS) with construction allowing for conversion into carrier. So they were to be converted into CVLs which can carry some 30 planes each. Looks good – until we find out, that at the same time IJN desperately tried to attend lack of seaplane capacity of the fleet. Cruiser “Mogami” and oiler “Hayasui” received expanded seaplane facilities. Later on “Ise” class battleships and “Tamano” class oilers were also to receive capability to carry seaplanes and even launch carrier aircraft from special trollies. All this added no carrier decks, but at the same time relieved carriers from such tasks as reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrols, etc. And new seaplane fighters and dive-bombers allowed for support of the regular carriers in combat. Each plane, doing such job from the board of the CVS, relieved a plane aboard CV for other mission.

Now the mystery: why to convert existing seaplane carriers into regular carriers if you still need seaplane carriers??? In mid-1942 there were 3 high-speed CVS in the IJN: “Chitose”, “Chiyoda” and “Nisshin” (last two were converted into midget submarine carriers, but still could carry seaplanes on the upper decks). Instead of quick re-conversion of two ships into CVS, “Chitose” and “Chiyoda” were converted into carriers while “Nisshin” remained to be used as fast transport without any plans for its CV conversion. In my opinion, “Chitose”, “Chiyoda” and “Nisshin” with some 20 seaplanes each would’ve been way better addition to the fleet, then converted “Mogami”, “Ise” and “Hyuga”. And the conversion times will be way shorter.


 
 “Chitose” as seaplane and regular aircraft carrier


Now about other ships in this plan: “Kaiyo” (ex-“Argentina Maru”) and “Brazil Maru”. Together with other 4 CVs, converted from merchant ships, they are often called “escort carriers” – which is incorrect. Those 2 ships were to receive destroyer turbines so they could operate with “Junyo” class CVs and older battleships. But this never happened. Just like planned conversion of 3 ships of the “Asama Maru” class along the same lines. Some other ships can follow, each carrying c.20 planes. Of course, those ships weren’t as good, as purpose-built carriers. But they were there and could bring up IJN fleet carrier strength by 100-plus aircraft by mid-1944.


Aircraft carrier “Kaiyo”


Another mystery is lack of progress with aircraft carrying fast oilers of “Hayasui” and “Tamano” classes, also ordered in 1942. Of 15 ships planned only “Hayasui” was completed. They were too complicated for mass production? – Why not to build something similar on the base of standard 1TL wartime standard tankers?


Model of "Tamano" oiler


But the biggest mystery of them all in this 1942 plan is a total lack of anything resembling carriers, built on the hulls of wartime standard ships. After Midway there was a special study about merchantmen, converted into carriers to transport aircraft. Even if they had little value for the fleet battle, they can relieve fleet carriers from transport missions, convoy escort and other secondary duties. But only in 1944 few such ships were planned, but even then at first as Merchant aircraft carriers, which continued to carry cargo and operated under civilian command with small military aircraft detachment aboard. Only later some of them become full-fledged escort carriers. The most surprising – the driving force behind this was apparently not Japanese Navy, but Japanese Army.



IJA "Yamashiro Maru" post war. Forward part of flying deck removed after the war


One can say all those change doesn’t matter. IJN was doomed to lose from the beginning of the war due to the disparity of strength with its enemies. May be. But it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t research the decisions made by the Japanese Navy to see if they were optimal or not.

Eugen Pinak 

23 October 2022

14/10/2022

Never trust your local theater with the history research...



If you think the two Ukrainians on the right of the photo of the soldiers from Ukrainian unit in 1917 looks ridiculous, you are right. The trick is – for them it was truly a matter of pride.

When after the Russian Revolution of February 1917 Ukrainian national revival exploded in full force, a lot of Ukrainians begun to search for the positive examples from the past. And for many this positive example was the Ukrainian Cossacks of old.

The problem was – few people had any idea, how those Cossacks actually looked like. The Cossackdom in Ukraine was destroyed in the second half of the 18th century. More than enough time for historical memory about Cossack dress to fade.

As a result people looked at the current popular culture for the image of The True Cossack. Which has very little in common with the reality – but nobody knew that. As a result you can see looks like this.

12/10/2022

Soviet-Japanese friendship - maga style

 

German caricature, showing new period of Soviet-Japanese friendship after establishing diplomatic relations in 1925 - in maga style.

John Bull is certainly not happy.

09/10/2022

Japanese official histories of the Pacific War

 

The box cover of one of the volumes of “Sensi Sosho”.

After the surrender of Japan in World War II, the US intelligence personnel found themselves in a very comfortable position. The US occupation administration simply gave an order - and the Japanese authorities quickly organized the writing of the history of the Second World War in the Pacific from the Japanese point of view in order to make it easier for American researchers to work on American history of the Pacific War.

Unfortunately, from the triad “fast, cheap, high quality – chose two of three” the Americans decided to dispense with “high quality”. As a result, the first Japanese history of WWII, better known by its name in English as “Japanese Monographs”, was largely a victim of haste.

First, the monographs differed in quality: from the general history of military transport throughout the war to the description of the capture of a small island. The monographs themselves were small at first, apparently due to the tight deadlines for writing. Where it turned out to be necessary to describe a serious issue, the authors worked in the style of “novel in the newspaper” - they divided the topic into chapters and proceeded them in turn one by one. There was no unified editing of proofreading. Over time, the haste has subsided, and later Monographs were begun to resemble monographs in size and detailed description of the topic.

The Monographs themselves are largely paraphrases or quotations from official documents. Which is not surprising, since the authors simply did not have the time for serious analysis and synthesis. 

Moreover, not everything, that needed to be written, was actually written. For example, there is no Monograph on the Battle of Midway and the attack on Pearl Harbor (the monograph on Pearl Harbor is actually just a collection of documents). As I understand it, this was due to the fact that the people, who could write these monographs, were working directly with the Americans. In addition, not everything, that the Japanese wrote, was translated into English.

The English language of monographs, by the way, is a problem in itself. Of course, even a bad translation is better than no translation - which explains the popularity of monographs among non-Japanese researchers to this day. But this does not change the fact that the Monographs were translated by a variety of translators, who did not worry about the consistence of the translation of terminology, place names, etc. Moreover, there are specific errors in the translations, especially in the names of ships and the names of people, which are not so easy to translate from Japanese.

As a result, in the mid-1950s US personnel was tasked with editing and proofreading the translations of some of monographs. But interest in them faded, so only part of the monographs was edited.

Brief history of creation, list and description of monographs (sometimes very critical):

https://oregondigital.org/sets/easia/oregondigital:df72dt655#page/1/mode/1up

Texts of Japanese Monographs online: https://pacificwararchive.wordpress.com/2019/01/27/japanese-monographs/

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The shortcomings of the Japanese Monographs were already obvious at the time of their writing, so the Japanese Institute of Military History begun to make a better quality history of the Pacific War. The process was led by Hattori Takushiro, former Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army.

8-volume work “The Complete History of the War in Great East Asia” = 大東亜戦争全史, published in 1953-56, turned out to be a book of a completely different level than the Japanese Monographs - the quality of the authors’ work is evident here. But there are questions here as well. First, history is written almost exclusively from the Army's point of view and at a strategic level. There were simply not enough resources to describe tactical actions. Secondly, the officers of the General Staff were not inclined to particularly analyze or criticize their own actions.

Nevertheless, this work was a quality research which turned out to be quite popular for a book on such peculiar topic. Japanese edition has been reprinted twice and had also been translated into English and Chinese. Its’ abbreviated version was translated into Russian under the title “Japan at War” (very rare thing for Japanese book). However, not everything was translated - the tender souls of Soviet propagandists could not stand the encounter with the real description of the Japanese campaign in Manchuria in 1945, so they simply threw it out of the book, replacing it with a condemning philippics against “falsifications” in the style of the editorial of the “Krasnaya Zvezda” newspaper (official newspaper of the Soviet Army).

==========

Meanwhile former officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy also worked on better quality history of the Pacific War, named “Nippon Kaigun Senshi” = “War History of the Japanese Navy” = 日本海軍戦史. In 1950 at least 11 small volumes were published. But those volumes were, in fact, improved versions of the Japanese Monographs, which hardly looked impressive compared to “The Complete History of the War in Great East Asia” then in the making.  That’s why this project was abandoned.

==========

It is clear that the Institute of Military History was not going to stop after the release of Hattori’s book. There, work continued on the new Japanese history of WWII, known as the “Senshi Sosho” = “Military History Series” = 戦史叢書. Work has accelerated sharply after most of the documents, confiscated by the USA after the war, were returned to Japan in the mid-1960s.

But Japanese military historians were not going to limit themselves to documents. Numerous veterans were involved in the work, who could use their diaries (during WWII, keeping a diary was considered almost an integral part of the life of an educated Japanese) and documents in their possession (which sometimes were not available elsewhere). Moreover, draft versions of the chapters of the new history were actively discussed, and veterans, who were directly related to these events, also participated in the discussions.

The first volume of “Sensi Sosho” was published in 1966, the last (102nd) - in 1980. 2 more volumes with collections of documents were published in the mid-1980s.

The work on “Sensi Sosho”, which lasted for almost thirty years, brought very positive results. This time both army and navy points of view on the war were recorded for the posterity. In these volumes there was a place not only for strategies, not only for operations, but also for describing actions at the tactical level. A huge advantage compared to previous histories was that at least some mentions of the sources of the information have finally appeared which were not present in previous versions.

But in fairness, it should be noted that this version of Japanese official history was not without flaws. A very sad division into history from the Army point of view and history from the Navy point of view has been preserved. One and the same operation can be described in two volumes: army and navy - and described in different ways. And sometimes aviators also insert their point of view. At the same time, even in dry lines, one sometimes feels a desire to hurt, to show flaws of the opposite service.

The Japanese did not succeed in creating a single, unified concept of the description of the Second World War in the Pacific. Each volume is a “thing in itself”, and one volume may well contradict with another.

It would be useful to note the simple fact that the history of the war, written by the participants, contains a lot of valuable details - but usually completely devoid of any critical view of events. Not every person is able to engage in self-criticism, while understanding perfectly well that it will be recorded in the history book. On the other hand, given the paucity of the documents, available to the authors of official history, the mass recruitment of veterans with their diaries/documents was the best way to solve the problem. And for a historian, the saddest thing is the lack of a full-fledged reference apparatus, which makes it very difficult to verify the source of the particular information.

Despite its historical value, “Senshi Sosho” has hardly been translated into other languages. One volume (about the “Battle of a Hundred Regiments” in North China) was translated by the Chinese, an excerpt from two volumes on the battles in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands was translated by the Australians. Only the Dutch were able to make a coherent effort to make a good translation into English of three volumes dedicated to the capture of the Netherlands East Indies (current Indonesia).

Text of all volumes of "Senshi Sosho" in Japanese: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/military_history_search/

Australian translation (parts of 14th and 28th Army Volumes): http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/Web-Pages/JapaneseOperations?OpenDocument

Dutch translations:

Volume 3 (Army): https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/35184

Volume 26 (naval): https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/65910

Actions of the Army Aviation (34th volume and part of the 5th): https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/3166200

==============

Unfortunately, this is where the Japanese decided to end the official writing of the history of WWII in the Pacific. With the exception of identifying and correcting errors in the “Senshi Sosho”, there is no new work on the academic history of World War II in Japan.

 The best time to start something is NOW.